






In 2004, the European economy strengthened and output
growth of 13/4 percent in the euro area was close to its
trend, although the output gap remained large and unem-
ployment increased further. The recovery was export-led
with spending shifting only gradually to domestic
demand. After a weakening in the second half of 2004,
mainly because of higher oil prices and lower growth in
world trade, the economic expansion is expected to con-
tinue at a moderate pace during 2005 with growth in the
euro area averaging again only 13/4 percent. This will
once more be insufficient to reduce the output gap and
unemployment will remain high. The recovery in Europe
remains fragile, depending on the global upturn remain-
ing intact without major exchange-rate turmoil and on
oil prices not rising further. Despite some narrowing of
growth between Europe, the United States and Asia,
external imbalances between the regions remain large
and could trigger a further fall of the US dollar and a
strengthening of the euro. Under such circumstances
growth of the European economy could be even weaker.
1. The current situation 
In 2004, the European economy strengthened and
output in the euro area increased on average by
1.8 percent (after only around 1/2 percent in 2003).
Growth was close to the trend rate (of 2 percent),
so that the output gap – a measure of the under-
utilisation of resources – did not shrink. This devel-
opment was only slightly weaker than our forecast
in last year’s report (we had forecast growth of
2 percent). Indeed, most of our assumptions in the
report did materialise. In particular, the global
recovery strengthened and nominal and real inter-
est rates remained at historically low levels.
However, oil prices increased more than expected.1
The sharp appreciation of the euro in 2003 (by
around 12 percent against the currencies of major
trading partners) came to a halt in 2004, although
towards the end of the year the euro began to
strengthen again. 
In the first half of 2004, growth was stronger than
expected, but the expansion lost momentum in the
second half and business expectations weakened
again and more recently the assessment of the present
situation also declined slightly (Figure 1.1). In
Germany, where the combination of both compo-
nents of the Ifo business climate indicator (assessment
of actual conditions and expectations) tends to move
in a clockwise manner over the business cycle, the cur-
rent level neither points to a downturn of the econo-
my nor to a strong upturn that would help lift growth
in Europe as a whole (Figure 1.2). (For further details
on business confidence in individual countries and
regions see Appendix 2.) 
Boosted by stronger export growth, investment in the
euro area started to increase after a decline in the two
preceding years, albeit at a moderate pace. Private con-
sumption remained subdued reflecting low real income
growth, which was depressed by higher energy prices
and poor labour market conditions. Consumer spend-
ing, however, was not uniform and in a few countries
such as France, Spain and Portugal it recovered – part-
ly reflecting a decline in household savings – while in
others, in particular Germany, it remained weak. (For
the contribution of domestic demand to quarterly
eurozone GDP growth see Figure 1.3.)
Economic growth continued to be higher in the
United Kingdom than in the three big euro countries
France, Italy, and Germany and was also above aver-
age in all the Nordic countries and in Ireland as well
as in Spain. 
Central and Eastern European economies also
achieved higher growth than the EU average – reflect-
1 Growth was stronger in the first half and weaker in the second half
of 2004 than projected, being related to the unexpected increase in
oil prices. During the year, the oil price (Brent) increased to between
45 and 50 US dollars per barrel, while last year’s forecast assumed
that it would remain at around 28 US dollars.  *The forecast is based on data available until 10th of February 2005.ing their catching-up from low income levels – with
the highest growth being recorded in the Baltic states,
Poland, and the Slovak Republic. 
1.1 The United States and Asia as
engines for European growth
In 2004, European growth de-
pended – once more – on the
strength of the world economy.
World output increased by 5 per-
cent (after almost 4 percent in
2003) and the strengths of the US
and Asian economies were again
the main forces behind the global
expansion. Growth of the world
economy was stronger than
expected in our last year’s re-
port.2 But the sharp rise in oil
prices has raised concerns about
the sustainability of the global
recovery. 
In the United States, despite
some deceleration during the
course of the year, GDP growth
in 2004 is expected to have
reached 4.4 percent (after 3 per-
cent in 2003). Growth was sup-
ported by all major demand com-
ponents. Business investment
remained strong throughout the
year boosted by low interest rates,
higher profits and rising capacity
utilisation. Housing investment
also remained buoyant, support-
ed by low interest rates. Private
consumption benefited from
additional tax cuts, rising real
wages, higher employment, low
interest rates, and further rising
house prices. A huge public sec-
tor deficit continued to add to
aggregate demand. Exports were
driven by higher global demand
and the depreciation of the US
dollar, but as imports increased
again faster than exports, the
contribution of net exports to
output growth remained negative
and the current account deficit
reached a new record high of
53/4 percent of GDP (after 43/4
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world economy, 4.2 percent for the United States, 1.9 percent for
Japan, and 8.1 percent for China. In all three regions, growth turned
out to be higher (4.4, 2.9, and 9 percent, respectively).EEAG Report 11
Chapter 1
flects the growing gap between domestic savings and
investment. While investment continues to rise,
domestic savings remain low. The low savings rate is
caused by both low savings of private households,
declining to around 1 percent of disposable income,
and high negative government savings. Compared
with earlier upswings, job creation remained sluggish,
raising concerns about jobless growth, but employ-
ment improved later in the year. 
In Japan, the economic expansion, which had started
in 2003, strengthened further. Output growth reached
a record 5.2 percent annual rate in the first quarter of
2004, but stagnated in the second and third quarters.
It may have reached almost 3 percent for the year as a
whole (after 2.5 percent in 2003). In contrast to previ-
ous short-lived recoveries, the expansion was not dri-
ven by additional fiscal stimulus.3 The major driving
forces of output growth were exports, in particular to
China, and business investment, which was stimulated
by higher profits resulting from
exports and from ongoing corpo-
rate restructuring. Private con-
sumption also recovered and was
supported by a decline in house-
hold savings and a moderate
increase in employment. Nomi-
nal and real wage rates, however,
continued to decline. Despite
higher annual growth and higher
oil prices, deflation has not yet
come to an end. While the decline
of consumer prices has almost
stopped, the decline of the GDP
deflator has not.4 The fall in land
prices continued for the thir-
teenth consecutive year, although
rising land prices in some metro-
politan areas may be signalling
the end of land price deflation.
As bank loans are often backed
by real estate as collateral, land
price deflation continued to have a negative impact on
banks’ balance sheets. At the same time, banks
reduced the amount of non-performing loans. While
the fall in bank lending continued in its six consecu-
tive year, it was no obstacle to the recovery of business
investment as this was mainly financed by retained
profits. 
During recent years, China has become an important
engine of growth for the global economy as its rising
demand for imports has been fuelling the export-led
recoveries in other countries. China’s share in world
trade doubled over the past ten years and is now
above five percent; China’s increase in trade currently
accounts for around one quarter of world trade
Figure 1.4
Figure 1.5
3 The structural deficit declined slightly by
around 0.5 percentage points of GDP and
public investment declined by 14 percent.
Japan’s fiscal deficit remained very high,
however (almost 7 percent of GDP after
73/4 percent in 2003). Japan’s gross govern-
ment debt increased from 65 percent of
GDP in 1991 to more than 160 percent in
2004 and is now the highest in the OECD.
During the same period, government net
debt increased from 13 percent of GDP to
85 percent. Given the historically low inter-
est rates on government bonds, govern-
ment net interest payments, however, only
increased from 1.1 to 1.8 percent of GDP
during this period. But debt interest could
become a significant burden in the future.
4 The continued fall in the GDP deflator (by around 1 percentage
point) can be explained by the decline in unit labour costs (as wages
fall while productivity increases). However, after the recent introduc-
tion of chain-linked indices, the decline in the GDP deflator was
lower (and growth in real GDP was also lower) than previously
measured.growth. While aggregate demand in neighbouring
countries such as Japan and South Korea profits most
from trade with China, aggregate demand in other
countries and regions, including Europe, also bene-
fits.5 As China’s imports increased again more than its
exports, its current account surplus declined from
around 3.1 percent of GDP in 2003 to around 1.1 per-
cent in 2004. Given the mounting inflationary pres-
sures, credit conditions were tightened to reduce
growth. This together with the increase in oil prices
have had some effect and business confidence weak-
ened and showed only a moderate improvement in
recent months (Figure 1.5). Nevertheless, annual
growth remained at around 9 percent. China’s growth
was again driven by booming business investment,
reflecting high domestic saving and a large influx of
foreign direct investment, and by booming exports,
reflecting low labour costs.
1.2 The latest oil price hike
The strong recovery of the world economy has
increased demand for raw materials and in particular
crude oil. The rising demand for oil, in particular by
China and the United States, met with supply disrup-
tions in Iraq and uncertainties over the fate of
Russia’s top producer Yukos. In addition, speculative
purchases and, perhaps, the response of oil producers
to the decline in the dollar exchange rate, pushed oil
prices to record levels of around 50 US dollars per
barrel in October (Figure 1.6). The hike in oil prices
has raised fears that the recovery of the world econo-
my may slow. Indeed, the inflationary pressures stem-
ming from the increase in energy prices brought the
process of disinflation to a halt (Figure 1.7) and
dampened real spending in a number of countries.
More recently, oil prices have declined again and,
assuming that the increase in oil
prices will be contained, energy
prices will only have a transition-
al impact on inflation and
growth. However, if oil demand
should continue to rise more than
supply, oil prices will rise again
and the impact on inflation and
growth could become more sig-
nificant than assumed in our pro-
jection. 
1.3 The international policy mix
In the industrial countries, the
stance of macro policies contin-
ued to be accommodative, even
more so in the United States and
Japan than in Europe. With
respect to fiscal policy, the differ-
ence between structural deficits
remained large. In the euro area,
the (average) structural and actu-
al deficits remained broadly con-





5 During 2003 and 2004, exports to China
accounted for about a third of the rise in
total Japanese exports and over 40 percent
of the rise of South Korean exports, but
less than 10 percent of the rise in total
German exports and less than 5 percent of
the rise in total French exports. The main
reason is that in Japan and Korea the
share of exports to China is much higher
than in Europe. While Japanese and
South Korean exports to China amount
to around a quarter of their total exports,
exports of the euro area to China only
amount to around 3 percent of total
exports (excluding intra-area trade). EEAG Report 13
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GDP for the structural and
around 23/4 percent for the actual
deficit), reflecting a rather neu-
tral stance of fiscal policy.6
Countries with better fiscal posi-
tions tended to provide a larger
fiscal stimulus than countries
where deficits were already above
the Maastricht ceiling. An excep-
tion, however, was Greece where
the surge in spending for the
Olympic Games led to an in-
crease in the actual deficit from
around 41/2 to 51/2 percent of
GDP and of the cyclically-
adjusted deficit from 51/4 to 53/4
percent of GDP (see Appendix 3
on the Stability Pact).7 In 2005
the structural deficit in the euro area will decline by
about 1/2 percentage point to 11/2 percent of GDP. In
the United States, the structural deficit remained at
41/4 percent of GDP providing no additional boost to
domestic demand, although between 2000 and
2003/2004 US fiscal policy had provided a historical-
ly large stimulus with a deterioration of the structural
fiscal balance by 51/2 percentage points of GDP and
of the actual fiscal balance by around 6 percentage
points. Japan continued to run the largest structural
fiscal deficit, which is clearly unsustainable; in 2004,
the structural deficit amounted to 61/4 percent of
GDP and the actual deficit to 61/2 percent of GDP 
Monetary conditions remained favourable everywhere
in 2004 but – given the lower real interest rates and the
depreciation of the US dollar against the euro – con-
tinued to be more accommodative in the United
States than in the euro area. Towards the end of 2004,
the euro further strengthened against the dollar,
reaching very high levels. Only after German unifica-
tion was the respective deutschemark exchange rate
(expressed in ECU) higher. Figure 1.9 shows the value
of the euro in terms of dollars as well as the purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) of the
euro for alternative commodity
baskets.8 As a rule, a country’s
commodity basket contains many
of those goods that are cheap
there. The exchange rate of
another country’s currency must
Figure 1.8
Figure 1.9
8 Note that the series do not represent an
index that is normalized at any point in
time. The reported values are computed
for a standard basket of goods consumed
in the respective countries with city prices
in the capitals of the countries normalized
to one. A value of 1.30 in 2004 therefore
means that a resident of Berlin would pay
1.3 times the price of the basket consumed
at home if he moved to the United States
and purchased the same basket of goods
in Washington DC. The calculations are
based on prices of identical goods weight-
ed by their share in a typical consumption
bundle in the respective country.
6 The decomposition of the government budget into a cyclical and
non-cyclical or structural component aims at separating cyclical
influences on the budget balances resulting from the divergence
between actual and potential output (the output gap) from those
which are non-cyclical. Changes in the latter can be seen as a cause
rather than an effect of output fluctuations and may be interpreted
as a proxy for discretionary policy changes. The structural budget
balance is derived by (re-)calculating government revenues and
expenditures which would be obtained if output (GDP) were at its
potential (or trend) level. We follow here the approach used by the
OECD. See also Chapter 2 of our 2003 report.
7 Greece has significantly revised its deficit and debt-to-GDP ratios.
The deficit ratio has been raised from around 11/2 percent on average
between 2000 and 2003 to 4 percent, which is above the Maastricht
ceiling and – had it been known at the time – would not have allowed
Greece to enter the euro area. The debt ratio has been revised
upwards from an average of around 105 percent of GDP to around
113 percent for the same period.be low if that country’s commod-
ity basket is to be as expensive as
the home country’s. Thus, the
PPP value of the euro is low
when the American basket is
chosen and high when the
German basket is chosen. The
lower and upper PPP lines in the
figure reflect this. In addition, the
figure contains an intermediate
PPP line that refers to a stan-
dardised international basket as
defined by the OECD. In 2004,
the PPP value of the euro was
1.06 according to the OECD bas-
ket and 0.86 according to the US
basket. As the figure shows, the
euro exchange rate is now much
higher than the OECD basket
PPP and even higher than the
German basket PPP. Hence, at
the current exchange rate, it is
relatively cheap for Europeans to
spend their money in the United
States rather then at home or to
import goods and services, while
exporting becomes more difficult
(Figure 1.9). 
While the European Central
Bank left its target interest rate
unchanged at 2 percent and the
Bank of Japan continued its
zero interest rate policy, the US
Federal Reserve began, in the
summer of 2004, to reduce the
monetary stimulus by raising
the Federal funds rate in con-
secutive steps (Figure 1.10). In
the United Kingdom, where
economic growth has remained
stronger than in continental
Europe, the central bank also
gradually raised interest rates in
an attempt to cool activity and,
in particular, to dampen the
boom in the housing market
(see Chapter 5 of this report).
In most countries, real short-
term interest rates continue much below their equi-
librium levels, currently being close to zero in the
euro area, Japan, and the United States (Fi-
gure 1.11). 
The increase in oil prices has raised the issue whether
monetary authorities should raise interest rates to
fight inflation or keep rates low to support growth.
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been relatively modest and that the ECB and the Bank
of Japan have not yet raised rates at all suggests that
central banks are generally interpreting the oil price
hike as temporary and not affecting long-term infla-
tion expectations, in particular as the recent weaken-
ing of growth has slowed down the closing of output
gaps. In our view this is a realistic assumption. 
Nominal and real government bond yields edged up
temporarily in 2004, but this development was
reversed later in the year. In the euro area nominal
long-term rates remained on average at 41/4 percent
and real rates at 21/2 percent. At the same time, the
risk premium of industrial bonds remained low.
Although the increase in share prices came to a halt at
the beginning of 2004, overall financing conditions
remained favourable (Figure 1.12). Nevertheless, bank
lending to corporations remained low in the euro
area. This could reflect low credit demand as invest-
ment could be financed by retained profits. It could
also reflect more cautious lending behaviour by
banks, which were still strained by earlier stock mar-
ket declines. 
2. Economic outlook 2005: Recovery in the world
economy and in Europe continues
2.1 The global economy
In 2005, we expect the expansion of the world econo-
my to continue at a moderate pace. This is based on
the following assumptions:
• In the United States, the Federal Reserve is
assumed to increase interest
rates further, but real short-
term interest rates will remain
below the so-called neutral
rate9 so that monetary condi-
tions will continue to support
an increase in demand. The
structural fiscal deficit is ex-
pected to decline only margin-
ally (by 1/4 percentage points of GDP), implying
only a modest fiscal tightening. Relatively strong
productivity growth will continue to raise corpo-
rate profits and also boost real wages. Household
income will also be supported by a further rise in
employment. Business investment will remain
strong as capacity utilisation and profit expecta-
tions increase further, but growth in housing
investment is expected to decline significantly.
Output is assumed to increase by 3 percent in 2005,
after 4.4 percent in 2004, but this will still not fully
close the output gap in 2005. 
• Growth in the Asian economies, in particular in
Japan and in China, will also decelerate – from
2.9 percent to 1.2 percent in Japan and from 9 per-
cent to 8 percent in China – but there will be no
“hard landing” of these economies. 
• The continued recovery in the United States, Asia
and Europe will help the world economy to con-
tinue its expansion albeit at a somewhat lower rate
than in 2004. World trade is expected to increase
by around 71/2 percent in 2005, after around 10 per-
cent in 2004.
• Oil prices (composite index) are assumed to remain
on average at a similar level as in 2004 (37 US dol-
lars in 2005 after 38 dollars in 2004). In nominal
terms the oil price would be still similar to the levels
which triggered recessions in many countries in the
early 1980s, but the real oil price (in constant 1995
dollars) is significantly lower than during earlier
peaks and the appreciation of the euro against the
dollar has also dampened the increase in the euro oil
price (Figure 1.13). The importance of oil to the
economies, as measured by the oil import bill as a
percentage of GDP, has been reduced significantly
Figure 1.13
9 In the United States, in the past, a real
short-term interest rate of around 3 percent
was commonly thought to reflect the neu-
tral rate at which monetary policy is neither
expansionary nor restrictive. According to
more recent estimates, however, the neutral
rate has fallen below 21/2 percent. See
Thomas Laubach and John C. Williams,
“Measuring the natural rate of interest,”
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
November 2003, 85(4): 1063–1070; OECD
Economic Outlook No. 76, November 2004,
Box 1.4.over the past decades, in many countries by more
than half. Furthermore, oil producing countries are
assumed to spend a good part of their additional
revenues on imports from industrial countries so
that the net effect on world output growth will be
muted (see Appendix 4). 
• The euro exchange rate is assumed to remain on
average below 1.35 dollars in 2005 after averaging
1.24 dollars in 2004. 
Risks and uncertainties
The following forecast for the European economy is
based on relatively favourable external assumptions,
but major downside risks remain. Oil prices could
start to rise again and this could hurt business confi-
dence and reduce global growth. In addition, the
existing external imbalances with the high US current
account deficit (at around 6 percent of GDP) could
trigger sharp exchange rate movements with a further
dollar depreciation and euro appreciation. This could
erode the price competitiveness of European ex-
porters and bring the export-led recovery in Europe to
a sudden end. Job creation in industrial countries may
also remain lower and households may increase sav-
ings, so that consumption remains weaker than
assumed. Furthermore, in countries that are currently
experiencing a boom in the housing market housing
investment could slump. Finally, China’s economy
could face a hard landing rather than the assumed
soft slowdown. This would also reduce growth in the
global economy.
Should some of these risks materialise, European
growth would be lower than projected below. While
there are also upside risks to the forecast – confidence
effects and accelerator effects on domestic demand
might be larger, so that the
rebound of the European econo-
my could be stronger than
expected as is often the case dur-
ing early recovery periods – we
believe the downside risks cur-
rently to be somewhat higher
than the upside risks. 
2.2 The European economy 
in 2005
Policy assumptions
Despite the continued recovery
of the eurozone, the cyclical slack
will remain large and put down-
ward pressure on the inflation
rate. Under these conditions, the
ECB is assumed to keep interest rates unchanged dur-
ing 2005.
The stance of fiscal policy in the euro area is assumed
to remain broadly similar to that of 2004 with only a
modest tightening. Countries seem to be reluctant to
reduce structural deficits significantly in view of high
unemployment, and the fiscal rules in the Stability
and Growth Pact are in effect becoming less firm (see
Appendix 3) (Figure 1.14). The degree of already
achieved consolidation and of additional efforts differ
quite substantially among countries, however. For
example, Finland is continuing to run a budget sur-
plus and in Spain and Ireland government budgets
will be broadly balanced. On the other hand, Greece,
France, Germany, Italy and Portugal will continue to
run deficits at or above the three-percent limit of the
Maastricht Treaty (Table A3). Outside the euro area,
government budgets in some countries (Sweden and
Denmark) will remain in surplus, while the United
Kingdom will continue to record a deficit of above
three percent. The new EU member states also tend to
run relatively high fiscal deficits and six of them have
deficits in excess of three percent of GDP. As the out-
put gap has been closed in the United Kingdom, its
entire deficit is structural, while in France, Germany,
Italy and Portugal, where output gaps prevail –
according to OECD estimates – between one fifth and
one half of the deficits are cyclical. 
Supply-side improvements and risks 
The challenge facing the European economy is to con-
tinue reducing the cyclical slack, and to improve the
growth potential. Whereas the former requires a con-
tinued accommodative stance of macro policies, in
particular easy monetary conditions, the latter
EEAG Report 16
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requires structural reforms, in particular improved
conditions for a better utilisation of the labour force.
Looking at cyclical conditions, aggregate demand and
capacity utilisation are still relatively low, but profit
margins are improving and overall conditions for
investment financing are favourable. Furthermore,
following a long period of weak business investment,
there is mounting pressure to modernise the capital
stock. In addition, a number of European countries
have implemented – or are in the process of imple-
menting – labour-market reforms that should make
labour markets more flexible. Although past reforms
have already shown positive results in some countries,
the new measures require time to have their full effects
(see Box 1.1). With the current cyclical weakness,
labour demand is relatively low, which makes it more
difficult to quickly absorb a reform-induced increase
in labour supply. This also creates political headwinds
Box 1.1
Labour Market Reform in Germany
Starting from January 2005, a number of changes in labour market institutions that were enacted in 2003 and 2004 willnow
become effective (see EEAG 2003, Box on p. 31 and EEAG 2004, Box 2.4). The most important of these changes is a
fundamental reform of the benefit system for the long-term unemployed and other non-employed individuals living on
general welfare benefits. According to official estimates, between 3 and 3.5 million individuals, or about 7 to 8 percent of
the total labour force, will be affected by this reform (IAB 2004).
Starting from 2005, the maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits (Arbeitslosengeld I) for older workers is
reduced from up to 32 months to 18 months; the period of benefit payments for younger workers remains at 12 months.
More importantly, unemployment assistance is integrated with social assistance to form one comprehensive scheme
(Arbeitslosengeld II) that is basically modelled on the less generous scheme of former social assistance and covers all non-
employed individuals of working age except those with unemployment insurance entitlements and those unfit for work or
engaged in a number of specific home responsibilities. For former recipients of social assistance who did not work, the level
of benefits remains largely unchanged. For former recipients of unemployment assistance, which is now abolished, there
can be substantial reductions of benefits. Unemployment assistance was based on earlier net wages and amounted to
53–57 percent of these, depending on whether beneficiaries had children or not. By contrast, the new benefit is defined by
the subsistence level of income of a given household. For the average unemployment assistance recipient, the reduction of 
benefits is about 8 percentage points. Benefit withdrawal rates are also slightly reduced (from between 85 and 100 percent
to between 70 to 80 percent) over a certain range of low incomes, but withdrawal rates are unchanged for higher incomes.
In certain income ranges they may now even exceed 100 percent for family households. Because of the reduction of 
withdrawal rates, former recipients of social assistance who worked may now receive higher benefits.
In addition to changes in benefit entitlements, requirements to search for a job and to accept jobs proposed by case
managers are being tightened: benefit sanctions in cases of non-compliance are higher and shall be applied more strictly
under the new framework than according to past practices. For the jobs offered to be acceptable, the new law specifies no
limits regarding qualifications demanded (compared to the job searcher’s formal skills or actual job experience), wages paid
(compared to wages earned in previous jobs, wage levels defined in collective agreements, etc.), or the number of working
hours regularly covered (in full-time, part-time, or even “mini” jobs).
Public protests against the reforms that were vigorous in the Summer of 2004 have now largely subsided. As the latest
reform steps that become effective now are unprecedented, assessing their consequences is difficult. In our view, they
mark an important step in the right direction, whereas earlier, less fundamental changes enacted since 2002 have largely
proven to be ineffective in reducing unemployment and promoting job creation (see Council of Economic Advisors 2004 and
2004 Joint Forecast of the Institutes).
An immediate consequence of the current changes could be that officially recorded unemployment rises by about 300,000
to 400,000, or by 0.7 to 0.9 percentage points, in January 2005 because individuals of working age who formerly received
social assistance, but did not register as being unemployed are now included in the statistics. As some of these individuals
will find a job during the course of the year, registered unemployment will fall again, but the annual average may be higher
than in 2004 by about 100,000 to 150,000. Hence by eliminating hidden unemployment of the social assistance system, the
reform would have reduced effective unemployment by 200,000 to 250,000, or by about half a percentage point. However,
benefit levels in the new scheme are still relatively generous, and withdrawal rates still very high, so that beneficiaries may
not accept jobs at low wages. It may therefore be necessary to further reduce benefit rates and withdrawal rates to
stimulate both labour supply and demand in an expanding low-wage sector of the labour market, as has been suggested by,
for example, the Council of Economic Advisors (2002), the Advisory Board of the Federal Ministry of Economics (2002)
andSinn et al. (2002).
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wane. Nevertheless, such reforms are urgent in order
to raise employment rates over the medium-term, in
particular as the employment targets for 2010 set in
Lisbon in 2000 seem currently out of reach.10
Under conditions of continued cyclical slack, pres-
sure for wage moderation will continue and this could
be reinforced by recent tendencies in some countries
(in particular Germany) to lengthen working hours
(see Chapter 3 of this report). As a result, unit labour
costs will be restrained and profit margins should
widen further, leading to an increase in investment
and employment. Given low inflation expectations
and high unemployment, the increase in oil prices is
unlikely to trigger higher wage claims that would
squeeze profits, even if such a risk cannot fully be
excluded. 
There is also a tendency that with European enlarge-
ment a greater share of total business investment will
be shifted to the accession countries where labour
costs are much lower than in the old EU states.
Investment in the euro area could therefore remain
lower than in previous economic recoveries and con-
cerns about outsourcing have been raised. Indeed,
many of the accession countries are recording high
foreign direct investment inflows, a good part of
which are from neighbouring western countries. As
already mentioned in last year’s report, such mobility
of capital should not be a major concern for long-
term growth of Europe as a whole, since it results in
an improved allocation of capital, incorporating
those regions of the continent that previously had
been artificially excluded from international invest-
ment flows by the Iron Curtain. Mobility of capital
also helps maintain the competitiveness of western
companies that succeed in keeping their wage bills
under control and withstand competition from other
parts of the world by outsourcing labour intensive
parts of their production to Eastern Europe.
However, flexible labour markets in Western Europe
are a prerequisite for the reallocation of capital not to
result in unemployment in the West and to boost eco-
nomic growth in the EU aggregate. Chapter 2 will dis-
cuss this in more detail. 
The development of demand components in the 
euro area
During the course of 2005, the ongoing expansion of
the world economy will probably continue to support
export growth. On average, euro area exports are like-
ly to increase somewhat less than in 2004. 
Private consumption is expected to be supported by an
improvement in labour market conditions and – after
the oil price effect has subsided – a decline in con-
sumer price inflation and in some countries also by
additional tax reductions. But there are also factors
which continue to restrain consumer spending. In par-
ticular, fiscal consolidation measures will continue to
place strains on private households by reducing trans-
fers and raising contributions to social security sys-
tems or to private pension and health care schemes.
Hence, we expect a continued moderate increase in
private consumption. 
With the continued strength in exports and further
improving profit margins as well as favourable financ-
ing conditions, the recovery in investment that began
in 2004 is expected to strengthen in 2005. Capacity
utilisation in the export sector has increased and in
domestically oriented sectors, where capacity utilisa-
tion is still low, there is mounting pressure to mod-
ernise the capital stock. 
Growth, employment and inflation
On average, output in the euro area is expected to
grow at a similar rate as in 2004 (13/4 percent)11
(Figure 1.15). The growth gap between Europe and
the United States will narrow somewhat, but only
because growth in the United States will decelerate
more than in Europe (Figure 1.16).12
Output growth will remain too weak to significantly
improve labour markets and in the euro area employ-
ment growth will continue to remain very small.
Unemployment will continue to remain high and is
expected to decline only marginally towards the end
of the year (Figures 1.17 and 1.18). Structural reforms
of the labour market, which have been implemented
in some countries, like Germany, should help to
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10 In March 2000, the EU member countries fixed numerical employ-
ment targets. The total employment rate (of those aged 15 to 64) was
targeted to increase on average by 61/2 percentage points to 70 per-
cent between 2000 and 2010, the employment rate of women by
around six percentage points to 60 percent, and the employment rate
of older workers (55 and older) by 12 percentage points to 50 per-
cent. However, the employment rate in EU-15 increased only by less
than 11/2 percentage points over the past four years and is unlikely to
increase by another five percentage points over the next five years. 
11 The precise numbers are 1.7 percent for 2005 and 1.8 percent in
2004 but this small difference lies well within the uncertainty range
of forecasting. 
12 It should be noted that the growth differential between Europe and
the United States is smaller with respect to GDP per capita than
GDP, as population growth in the United States is higher by 3/4 per-
centage points (almost 1 percent against 1/4 percent in Europe). Thus
in 2005, GDP per capita will increase by 11/2 percent in Europe com-
pared with around 21/4 percent in the United States, implying a fur-
ther widening of the income gap between Europe and the United
States. EEAG Report 19
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reduce unemployment over the medium-term,
although their short-term impact may be small and at
the beginning of the year the reform in Germany has
increased unemployment as more of the formerly hid-
den unemployed are now regis-
tered as unemployed (see Box 1.1
on labour market reform in
Germany). 
2.3 Differences in output growth
within Europe 
Despite the general recovery in
the euro area (and in Europe as a
whole) in 2004, there were signif-
icant differences in the output
growth of individual countries.
Among the countries with below-
average growth in 2003, a few
(Germany and France) achieved
almost average or above-average
growth in 2004, while in others
(Portugal, Italy and the Nether-
lands) growth remained below
average. In three countries of the
euro area (Greece, Ireland and
Spain) and in the UK, growth
was above 21/2 percent, with
Greece achieving the highest
growth rate, at 33/4 percent
(boosted by the Olympic games).
Growth in the four major new
EU member countries was also
uneven, with the highest growth
in Poland (at around 51/2 per-
cent), followed by the Slovak
Republic (at around 5 percent),
and Hungary and the Czech
Republic (at almost 4 percent).
Growth was even higher in the
Baltic States, at between 53/4 and
7 percent.
The differences in the growth per-
formance of individual European
countries reflect a number of fac-
tors, including statistical differ-
ences as the number of working
days in 2004 increased more in
some countries than in others.13
The new EU member countries
benefit from relatively favourable




13 This calendar effect was particularly marked in Germany where it
amounted to 0.5 percent in 2004. As in some countries GDP is
adjusted for the number of working days, growth rates are not fully
comparable. normal catching-up process (i.e. lower initial levels of
GDP per capita, low wage levels and relatively high
capital productivity). 
Wage moderation, as measured by the development of
nominal and real wages, continued in the euro area in
2004. With moderate nominal wage growth and high-
er productivity growth, the increase in unit labour
costs was lower than in 2003,
although this was not a uniform
pattern across countries (Ta-
ble 1.1). In countries like Italy
and Spain, increases in unit
labour costs remained above-
average, reflecting higher nomi-
nal wage increases and low pro-
ductivity growth. Outside the
euro area, the increase in wage
costs was also relatively high in
the United Kingdom despite
higher productivity growth.
Among the new EU member
countries, the increase in wage
costs was high in Hungary but
low in Poland. Unit labour costs
measured in a common currency, relative to those of
trading partners (an indicator often used as a proxy
for the real effective exchange rate) continued to
increase in the euro area as a result of the strengthen-
ing of the euro in contrast to the United States where
they declined. As a result, European countries lost
shares in their export markets although these losses





The development of various measures of wages and wage costs
Annual average changes inper cent
Nominal











Euro area 2001-2003 2.4 0.1 0.4 2.0 6.4
2004 1.9 0.0 1.2 0.7 5.1
of which:
Germany 2001-2003 1.6 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.6 1.0
2004 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 1.8 -0.5
France 2001-2003 2.5 0.7 0.5 2.0 0.9 -2.2
2004 2.7 0.8 2.8 0.1 -1.1 -3.9
Italy 2001-2003 2.9 0.0 -0.4 3.3 5.5 -4.7
2004 2.5 -0.3 0.3 2.2 4.6 -4.0
Finland 2001-2003 3.2 1.9 1.3 1.9 2.4 -1.8
2004 3.1 2.3 3.8 -0.7 1.3 -6.7
Netherlands 2001-2003 4.5 0.7 -0.4 4.9 6.2 -1.3
2004 1.8 1.0 2.6 -0.8 0.7 -0.7
Ireland 2001-2003 3.6 -0.3 3.4 0.2 0.2 2.1
2004 5.2 1.6 3.5 1.6 2.4 -0.9
Spain 2001-2003 4.6 0.4 0.7 3.9 3.2 0.7

















Sweden 2001-2003 2.9 1.0 1.3 1.6 -1.3 -0.5
2004 2.8 1.7 4.5 -1.6 3.1 2.4
Poland 2001-2003 3.8 1.9 4.8 -1.0 -8.6 3.2
2004 2.8 -1.1 5.4 -2.5 -10.9 3.5
Hungary 2001-2003 11.2 2.6 3.3 7.7 9.4 3.2

















Japan 2001-2003 -1.4 0.3 1.5 -2.9 -5.8 0.6
2004 -0.3 2.0 4.0 -4.3 -1.1 2.8
Notes: 1. Business sector.
2. Nominal wage deflated by GDP deflator (as a measure of the real product wage).
3. Competitiveness-weighted relative unit labour costs in dollar terms.
4. Export performance is the ratio between export volumes and (trade-weighted) export markets for goods and services.
Source: OECD, estimate for 2004, calculations by the Ifo Institute.EEAG Report 21
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moderation and a favourable commodity structure,
Germany’s export growth was only marginally lower
than the growth of its export markets, while Italy,
Finland, and the United Kingdom experienced larger
losses in export market shares. The new EU member
countries achieved further gains in market shares,
although (as in Hungary) the real exchange rate of
some countries appreciated. 
Domestic demand remained relatively weak in many
countries of the euro area. This was especially the case
in Germany and the Netherlands, where real income
growth was particularly low and households contin-
ued to increase their savings rates (in response to a
deteriorating labour market, policy uncertainties,
reforms of social security sys-
tems, and earlier losses in equity
wealth). In some other countries,
such as France and Spain,
domestic demand was stronger.
While in Spain private consump-
tion benefited from buoyant
income growth, in France con-
sumption was supported by a
decline in household savings. 
In 2005, growth differentials will
continue to remain significant
(Figure 1.19). 
Figure 1.19 EEAG Report 22
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Table A1
Real gross domestic product, consumer prices and unemployment rates






in % 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
EU25 33.7 1.0 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 9.1 9.0 8.9
Switzerland 0.9 -0.4 1.7 1.7 0.6 0.8 1.1 3.7 3.9 3.8
Norway 0.7 0.4 3.2 2.8 2.0 0.8 1.5 4.5 4.4 4.2
Western and Central Europe 35.3 1.0 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.0 8.9 8.8 8.7
USA 33.6 3.0 4.4 3.0 2.3 2.6 2.6 6.0 5.5 5.6
Japan 13.2 1.3 2.9 1.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 5.3 4.7 4.5
Canada 2.7 2.0 3.0 2.7 2.8 1.8 1.9 7.6 7.3 7.1
Industrialised countries total 84.7 1.9 3.2 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.9 7.6 7.1 7.0
Newly industrialised countries
Russia 1.3 7.3 6.8 5.3 13.6 11.0 10.6 8.7 7.8 7.0
East Asia
a) 4 . 6 3 . 7 6 . 2 5 . 4 ......
C h i n a 4 . 8 9 . 1 9 . 1 8 . 2 ......
Latin America
b) 4 . 6 1 . 7 5 . 1 3 . 9 ......
Newly industrialised countries
t o t a l 1 5 . 3 5 . 1 6 . 8 5 . 8 ......
Total
c) 100.0 2.3 3.8 2.9 . . . . . .
World trade, volume 4.2 10.0 7.5 . . . . . .
a) Weighted average of: Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines. Weighted with the gross domestic product of
2003 in US dollars. –
b) Weighted average of: Brasil, Mexico, Argentina, Columbia, Venezuela, Chile, Peru. Weighted with the gross domes-
tic product of 2003 in US dollars. –
c) Sum of the listed groups of countries. Weighted with the gross domestic product of 2003 in US dollars.




Real gross domestic product, consumer prices and unemployment rates in European countries






in % 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Germany 21.9 -0.1 1.7 1.2 1.0 1.6 1.4 9.6 9.7 9.8
France 15..9 0.5 2.2 1.8 2.2 2.3 1.9 9.4 9.6 9.5
Italy 13..4 0.3 1.3 1.6 2.8 2.3 2.2 8.6 8.3 7.9
Spain 7.6 2.5 2.6 2.4 3.1 3.1 3.0 11.3 10.8 10.5
Netherlands 4.7 -0.9 1.4 1.2 2.2 1.5 1.4 3.8 4.6 4.5
Belgium 2.8 1.3 2.6 2.4 1.5 1.9 1.7 8.0 7.8 7.6
Austria 2.3 0.8 1.8 2.1 1.3 1.9 1.7 4.3 4.5 4.3
Greece 1.6 4.5 3.7 2.6 3.4 3.1 3.4 9.3 8.9 8.9
Finland 1.5 2.0 3.2 2.8 1.3 0.1 1.6 9.0 8.9 8.8
Ireland 1.4 3. 7 4.5 4.4 4.0 2.3 2.8 4.6 4.5 4.3
Portugal 1.3 -1.2 1.2 1.4 3.3 2.5 2.3 6.3 6.5 6.5
Luxembourg 0.2 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 3.3 2.9 3.7 4.3 4.1
Euro areac) 74.5 0.5 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.9 8.9 8.8 8.7
United Kingdom 16.3 2.2 3.2 2.7 1.4 1.3 1.6 5.0 4.6 4.7
Sweden 2.7 1.5 3.5 3.0 2.3 1.2 1.6 5.6 6.3 6.1
Denmark 1.9 0.4 2.3 2.3 2.0 0.9 1.7 5.6 5.4 5.1
European Unionc) 95.5 0.8 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 8.1 8.0 7.9
Poland 1.9 3.8 5.4 4.4 0.7 3.5 3.1 19.2 18.8 18.5
Czech Republic 0.8 3.7 3.8 3.3 -0.1 2.6 2.7 7.8 8.4 8.4
Hungary 0.8 3.0 3.9 3.5 4.7 6.8 5.3 5.8 5.8 5.7
Slovakia 0.3 4.0 4.9 4.6 8.5 7.5 4.1 17.5 18.0 17.5
Slowenia 0.2 2.5 3.8 3.5 5.7 3.8 3.3 6.5 6.0 5.7
Lithuania 0.2 9.7 7.0 6.6 -1,1 1.0 2.5 12.7 10.8 10.2
Cyprus 0.1 1.9. 3.6 3.8 4.0 2.1 2.5 3.9 4.4 4.2
Latvia 0.1 7.5 6.5 5.9 2.9 6.2 5.5 10.5 9.8 9.4
Estonia 0.1 5.1 5.7 5.4 1.4 2.9 3.1 10..1 9.2 8.4
Malta 0.0 -0.3 0.9 1.1 1.9 2.9 2.7 8.2 7.3 6.9
EU Acceding
countries 4.5 3.7 4.7 4.1 2.7 2.1 3.4 14.4 14.1 13.8
EU25c) 100.0 1.0 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 8.8 9.1 9.0
a) Western Europe (except for Switzerland): harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – b)Standardised. – c) Sum of the listed countries.
Gross domestic product and consumer prices weighted with the gross domestic product of 2003 in US dollars; unemployment rate
weighted with the number of employees in 2003.
Sources: EUROSTAT; OECD; ILO; IMF; National Statistical Offices; 2004 and 2005: calculations by the Ifo Institute.EEAG Report 23
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Table A3
Indicators of the public budgets in the euro area
Gross debt1) Financial Balance1)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Germany 59.4 60.9 64.2 65.6 66.5 -2.8 -3.7 -3.8 -3.9 -3.1
France 56.5 58.8 63.7 65.0 65.7 -1.5 -3.2 -4.1 -3.7 -3.0
Italy 110.6 107.9 106.2 106.1 105.5 -2.6 -2.3 -2.4 -3.0 -3.5
Spain 57.5 54.4 50.7 48.6 45.9 -0.4 -0.1 0.4 -0.9 -0.5
Netherlands 52.9 52.6 54.1 56.0 58.1 -0.1 -1.9 -3.2 -3.0 -2.3
Belgium 108.1 105.8 100.7 95.5 94.2 0.6 0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.2
Austria 67.1 66.6 65.1 64.2 63.8 0.3 -0.2 -1.1 -1.3 -2.0
Greece 114.7 112.5 109.9 112.5 110.5 -3.7 -3.7 -4.6 -5.5 -4.4
Finland 43.8 42.6 45.6 44.1 43.5 5.2 4.3 2..3 2.1 2.1
Ireland 35.9 32.7 32.1 30.4 29.6 0.9 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.6
Portugal 55.8 58.4 60.3 60.7 61.7 -4.4 -2.7 -2.8 -2.9 -3.4
Luxembourg 5.5 5.7 5.4 5.0 5.1 6.4 2.8 0.8 -0.9 -1.8
Euro area2) 69.5 69.4 70.7 71.3 71.3 -1.7 -2.4 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6
United 
Kingdom
38.8 38.3 39.8 40.5 41.1 0.7 -1.6 -3.3 -2.9 -2.7
Sweden 54.4 52.6 52. 51.1 49.5 2.8 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.6
EU-15 63.3 62.7 64.3 64.8 64.8 -1.1 -2.1 -2.7 -2.6 -2.4
1) As a % of gross domestic product; in accordance with the delimitation according to the Maastricht Treaty. Financial balances
without the special revenue gains from the sales of mobile phone licences in 2000-2002. – 2) Sum of the countries: weighted with the
gross domestic product of 2003 in euro.
Source: Eurostat; 2004 and 2005: forecasts by the Ifo Institute.
Table A4
Key forecast figures for the euro area
2003 2004 2005
Percentage change over previous year
Real gross domestic product 0.5 1.8 1.7
Private consumption 1.0 1.2 1.4
Government consumption 1.7 1.6 1.1
Gross fixed capital formation -0.6 1.8 2.6
Exports
1) 0.9 5.7 5.1
Imports
1) 2.1 5.6 4.9
Consumer prices
2) 2.1 2.1 1.9
Percentage of 
nominal gross domestic product
Current account balance 0.4 0.3 0.4
Government financial balance -2.7 -2.7 -2.6
Percentage of employees
Unemployment rate
3) 8.9 8.8 8.7
1) Exports and imports contain products and services including the trans-border market
within the euro area. -
2)Harmonised consumer price index (HCPI).
3) Standardised.
Source: Eurostat; 2004 and 2005: forecasts by the Ifo instituteAppendix 2:
The Ifo World Economic Survey (WES)14
In January 2005 the World Economic Climate slightly
deteriorated for the fourth time in succession since
April 2004. Both components of the economic climate
index – current economic situation and expectations
for the coming six moths – have been downgraded
somewhat. However, the climate indicator, at 101.1
(after 103.8 in October; 1995=100), is still higher than
its long-term average (1990–2004: 93.0). In the follow-
ing we summarize the results of the latest survey. The
two components of the climate indicator, the assess-
ment of the current situation and the expectations for
the next six months, are depicted in the figures below.
World economy is losing steam
According to the latest WES results, growth is expect-
ed to slow down further in the coming months.
Although assessments of the current economic situa-
tion as well as economic expectations for the first half
of 2005 have been slightly downgraded by experts sur-
veyed in January, the change is not expected to result
in a strong downturn. Most determinants of the
short-term prospects remain positive. However, fur-
ther downward pressures remain: possible disruption
in oil supplies as result of terrorism or other military
actions in the Near East. Nevertheless, a soft-landing
of the economic climate index is seen by surveyed
experts to be the most likely scenario for 2005.
Western Europe: Economic performance remains
sluggish
The overall economic climate indicator slipped in
January for the second time in succession. The assess-
ments of the present economic situation have fallen
slightly below the satisfactory mark, on average for all
Western European countries. Also the economic
expectations for the coming six months have been
slightly downgraded but remained generally positive.
This pattern also holds true for the majority of coun-
tries of the euro area. However, in Belgium, Finland,
Spain and Greece, surveyed experts assessed the pre-
sent economic state somewhat better than in the
October survey. The best marks for the current eco-
nomic performance in the euro area were again given
by experts surveyed in Ireland and Finland. The low-
est marks for the present economic situation were
given by experts in Portugal, Italy and the Netherlands.
Though, Germany’s economy experienced an upturn
in 2004 thanks to strong exports and the world eco-
nomic recovery, its present economic situation is
assessed once again as below satisfactory. An impor-
tant aspect for the lagging economy in the euro zone
is the euro’s 50 percent appreciation against the dollar
over the past three years, as the cheaper dollar makes
European goods more expensive in global export mar-
kets. For 2005 experts in the euro zone are expecting
the export sector to develop less dynamically than in
2004. But the exchange rate is not the only dampening
factor. Unemployment and weak private consump-
tion are the other problem areas. However, surveyed
experts see an improvement in both aspects for the
first half of 2005.
The economic climate in the Nordic countries outside
the euro area (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and
Iceland) remained very favourable. The assessments
of the present economic situation continued to
improve in Denmark and  Norway and have been
slightly downgraded in Sweden, though remaining far
above the satisfactory level. Also, the United
Kingdom’s economy has begun 2005 on course to con-
tinue its period of growth, with low inflation and
interest rates, and the government continuing to meet
its fiscal goals. The current economic situation in the
UK has been assessed as highly satisfactory by WES
experts. The economic expectations for the next six
months point to further stabilization. Also in
Switzerland, the economic recovery continues to gain
momentum, according to the January survey. 
North America: Still the driving force in the world
economy 
According to the latest survey results, the economic
climate indicator in North America has improved in
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14 The World Economic Survey (WES) assesses worldwide economic
trends by polling transnational as well as national organizations
worldwide on current economic developments in their respective
countries. This allows for a rapid up-to-date assessment of the eco-
nomic situation prevailing around the world. In January 2005 some
1,130 economic experts in 90 countries were polled. The survey ques-
tionnaire focuses on qualitative information: assessments of a coun-
try’s general economic situation and expectations regarding impor-
tant economic indicators. It has proved to be a useful tool in that it
reveals economic changes earlier than traditional business statistics.
The individual replies are combined for each country without
weighting. The grading procedure consists in giving a grade of 9 to
positive replies (+), a grade of 5 to indifferent replies (=) and a grade
of 1 to negative (-) replies. Overall grades within the range of 5 to 9
indicate that positive answers prevail or that a majority expects
trends to increase, whereas grades within the range of 1 to 5 reveal
predominantly negative replies or expectations of decreasing trends.
The survey results are published as aggregated data. The aggregation
procedure is based on country classifications. Within each country
group or region, the country results are weighted according to the
share of the specific country’s exports and imports in total world
trade.EEAG Report 25
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January, due to higher marks for the present econom-
ic situation in the US. The country’s economy is still
fairly strong despite the slippage in business senti-
ments in the preceding October poll. However, the
economic expectations for the coming six moths have
been downgraded again, reflecting that business con-
fidence remains weakened though no sharp downturn
is expected. Concerns persist that the rising interest
rates and oil prices combined with federal budget
deficits and fears of expanded military activity in the
Near East may slow the US economy in 2005.
In Canada both components of the economic climate
index have deteriorated. However, the assessments of
the current economic situation remain favourable.
Economic expectations, though slightly downgraded,
are still generally positive. 
Eastern Europe: Further economic stabilization
The sluggish Western European economic perfor-
mance has evidently had no far-reaching effect on its
neighbours, particularly in Central and Eastern
Europe. According to the January survey, the overall
economic climate index followed its positive trend,
with the assessments of the current economic situa-
tion continuing to improve and economic expecta-
tions for the coming six months pointing upward. The
general present economic conditions as well as busi-
ness sentiments are regarded as positive, on average,
for Eastern Europe.
As already in the October survey, the assessments of
the present economic situation in almost all new EU
countries – Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia – were above
the satisfactory level in January. The present econom-
ic performance has considerably improved also in
Hungary, though the satisfactory level has not yet
been reached, according to WES experts. The fore-
casts for the coming six months remain positive
throughout. The strongest economies in the region,
according to WES experts, are Estonia, Poland, the
Czech Republic and  Slovenia. The surveyed econo-
mists remained optimistic about the near-term future.
Particularly capital expenditures and exports are
expected to boost the overall economic expansion in
the coming six months. 
Also in Eastern European countries outside the EU,
economic trends observed in January are generally
positive. The economic climate is particularly
favourable, according to WES experts, in Bulgaria and
Croatia. In Romania, Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina
and Serbia-Montenegro the present economic perfor-
mance is also rated “satisfactory” or above. The out-
look for the next six months points to a continuation
of the economic revival.
CIS: Moderate economic slowdown expected
According to preliminary official figures Russia’s
economy grew at about 7 percent in 2004, benefiting
from the rising prices for oil, gas and metals. In the
beginning of 2005 the economic climate in Russia
deteriorated somewhat, according to the recent WES
results. The present economic situation is judged less
favourably than in the preceding October survey. Also
the economic expectations, though remaining posi-
tive, have been slightly downgraded. Economic
growth is expected to slow in 2005, partly due to con-
straints on oil export capacity. This implies that for
achieving sustainable growth, Russia’s economy needs
restructuring away from its dependence on energy
resources. At present, investors are still suspicious
about the country’s corporate governance and
President Vladimir Putin’s commitment to reforms.
Less positive signals than in the October survey have
also been reported from the Ukraine. The present eco-
nomic situation has been described by WES experts as
slightly below satisfactory, but the prospects for the
coming six month have been upgraded here and are
now displaying optimism. Yushchenko, the new
President, wants EU membership talks to start in
2007 and thus there is more confidence among pan-
elists that Ukraine is now on course towards becoming
a full-fledged democracy and market economy. 
Very positive marks for the present economic perfor-
mance were given by experts in Kazakhstan. The econ-
omy grew at about 9 percent in 2004, making the
Central Asian country one of the fastest growing
economies in the CIS. The current situation is judged
at a highly favourable level and is expected to improve
further in the course of the next six months. Similarly
to Russia, much of the growth has been fuelled by oil
production. The extraction of natural resources
remains the most attractive sector for investors and
the main driving force for exports. However, other sec-
tors are also emerging, and the favourable general
economic outlook includes higher corporate activity
outside the oil sector as well as growth in private con-
sumption. Asia: Economic soft-landing
Asia was the most rapidly growing economic region in
2004, largely driven by China’s and India’s economic
expansions, making the Western economies increasing-
ly dependent on their Southeast Asian counterparts. In
January, the economic climate index in Asia deteriorat-
ed slightly for the third time in succession. The assess-
ments of the current economic situation have deterio-
rated somewhat, on average, for the Asian countries
surveyed by WES, mostly reflecting an economic cool-
ing-down in Japan. However, economic expectations
for the first half of 2005 point to an only moderate
slowdown of economic growth. The December 26
earthquake and the giant tsunami that shattered
coastal regions in 11 Asian countries, killing some
250,000 people and leaving millions homeless, has
caused no major damage to the economic infrastruc-
ture of the affected countries, while the costs in human
life remain, of course, appalling by any measure.
The economic recovery in Japan, the world’s second
largest economy, appears to be losing momentum,
according to WES experts. A further appreciation of
the yen against the dollar poses a downside risk, mak-
ing it difficult to keep Japanese exports attractive on
the global market. The Chinese economy was also
expected to achieve a soft-landing in 2005. But as it
seems, there has been no landing at all, as the assess-
ments of WES experts polled in the country in
January are more positive than in the October survey,
reflecting that optimism has the upper hand. But eco-
nomic near-term expectations remain subdued, sig-
nalling concerns that slowing global growth may
reduce demand for goods made in China. Never-
theless,  China’s long-term prospects remain very
promising. Particularly consumer spending is expect-
ed to continue benefiting from the country’s econom-
ic growth. Closely related to the economic growth of
the Chinese mainland are the business sentiments in
Hong Kong, where private consumption and invest-
ment in fixed assets gave momentum to economic
growth last year and are predicted to remain strong,
though to a slightly lesser degree than in 2004. Also
India will again record healthy economic performance
this year, according to WES experts. The overall eco-
nomic situation was assessed considerably above satis-
factory. The outlook for the coming six months is gen-
erally positive and implies further growth of corpo-
rate activity and private consumption. 
In Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan the assessments of
the present economic situation, though slightly deteri-
orated, remained far above the satisfactory level. In
Thailand major tourist areas were severely affected by
the tsunami. However, the assessments of the present
economic situation here even improved somewhat
from an already favourable level of the October sur-
vey. From an economic point of view, the impact of
the tsunami on Indonesia is also limited, since the
Aceh province contributes only 2.1 percent of
Indonesia’s GDP, and its oil and gas production
industries have not been affected. But the country’s
tourism industry has been strongly hit again, though
experts expect that the region’s tourism will recover
faster than after the Bali bombings in 2002 and the
SARS outbreak in 2003. Production and internation-
al trade flows were not affected in these countries, as
manufacturing production facilities and major ports
weren’t damaged and economic expectations for the
first half of 2005 remain generally positive.
Latin America: Economic rebound continues
According to the latest WES results, the assessments
of the present economic situation continue to improve
in all surveyed countries of the region without excep-
tion. Economic expectations are pointing to further
stabilisation in 2005. Further strengthening in
imports and exports is expected to support economic
growth in Latin America. Private consumption and
capital expenditures are also forecast to boost further
in the coming six months.
Except for Costa Rica and Paraguay, where the assess-
ments of the present economic situation have not yet
reached the satisfactory level, all countries have con-
tributed to the improvement of the economic climate
in the region. Chile again topped the list of expanding
economies. The present economic situation is regard-
ed as highly satisfactory and experts are confident
that the country’s economy will grow further in the
coming months. In the three major regional
economies,  Brazil, Argentina and  Mexico, WES
experts also reported an improvement of the current
economic situation. Economic expectations for the
coming six months, though slightly downgraded,
point to further stabilization. Particularly, Brazil’s
economic performance is surpassing economists’fore-
casts, as President Lula da Silva has implemented
enormous structural reforms since coming to power in
January, 2003. But also Argentina’s economy is mak-
ing considerable progress, according to surveyed
economists.  Venezuela’s economic performance has
also become noticeably better, with assessments of the
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present economic situation approaching the satisfac-
tory level and economic expectations for the first half
of 2005 being, except for the export sector, generally
optimistic. For the coming six months experts forecast
a decrease in exports. One reason may be that
Venezuela, the world’s fifth-largest producer of oil and
a major supplier to the United States, is planning to
reduce its dependence on the United States as the
main consumer of its oil.
Near East: Economic situation remains favourable
The economic situation in the Near East region has
further improved and continues to be highly
favourable in all countries covered by WES. However,
the near-term prospects for the first half of 2005 have
been slightly downgraded resulting in a lower value of
the economic climate index. 
The highest marks of business confidence were again
given by experts surveyed in the United Arab Emirates,
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and  Kuwait, followed by
Lebanon, Iran and Jordan. The prospects for further
economic stabilisation are, except in Iran, very bright. 
According to the January WES results, the economic
climate in Israel further improved. Both components
of the climate index – present economic situation as
well as economic expectations for the next six months
– received very positive marks. Turkey’s GDP expand-
ed by about 10 percent in 2004, making it’s economy
one of the world’s fastest-growing. Much of the GDP
growth is due to rising productivity and corporate
investment that are expected to strengthen further. In
2005 the country’s economy will remain on the strong
stabilization course that it set in 2002, according to
WES experts polled in January.EEAG Report 28
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Appendix 3:
Is the Stability and Growth Pact dead?
The EU fiscal policy framework, encompassed in the
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact,
is in crisis. In 2004, France and Germany ran budget
deficits in excess of the three-percent-of-GDP deficit
ceiling for the third consecutive year and they are like-
ly to do so in 2005 as well. The two countries are also
violating the stipulation that if government debt is
above 60 percent of GDP it must be decreased. Yet,
the excessive deficit procedures against these countries
were put on hold in late 2003, when the Ecofin
Council (the EU ministers of finance) did not heed
the recommendation of the Commission to give
notice to these countries to reduce their deficits in
2005. In a ruling in the summer of 2004, the European
Court of Justice did in principle accept the right of
the Ecofin Council to take such a political decision.
Several other EU countries have serious budgetary
problems as well. Greece, Portugal, and possibly Italy,
will also exceed the three-percent-of-GDP limit in
2005. Debt ratios in both Greece and Portugal have
been increasing, even though they are already above
60 percent of GDP. Greece has been underreporting
its deficits, which have in effect been above three per-
cent of GDP, for several years. There remain a num-
ber of question marks regarding the fiscal accounting
of other EU countries, for example Italy, too. In addi-
tion, six of the new EU member states (Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, and Slova-
kia) had budget deficits in excess of the three-percent
limit in 2004 and are likely to continue them in 2005
as well.
The EU fiscal rules were established as a counter-
weight to the excessive accumulation of government
debt in most European countries in the 1980s and
early 1990s. There were also fears that the common
currency would aggravate this deficit bias. Current fis-
cal developments seem to represent a gradual disman-
tling of fiscal discipline through contagion effects,
where higher deficits in one country are seen as an
excuse for higher deficits in others. This process is fur-
ther fuelled by the lax attitude towards the even larg-
er deficits in the United States.
There seems to have emerged a consensus that the
Stability Pact needs to be reformed. Many proposals
have been put forward and some of them are current-
ly being discussed among the EU finance ministers.
There could be a revision of the Stability Pact early
this year.
When evaluating reform ideas, it is helpful to distin-
guish between three aspects:
1. The economic contents of the rules.
2. Ex-ante measures to prevent violations of the
rules.
3. Ex-post enforcement once the rules have been
violated.
Clearly, the main problem with the stability pact is the
lack of ex-post enforcement. Yet, most reform pro-
posals have focused on the two other aspects.
The economic contents of the rules
The European Commission has come up with a num-
ber of proposals to modify the economic contents of
the rules (European Commission 2004a). These
include a larger emphasis on the debt level: a clarifi-
cation of what the requirement means that debt must
be “decreasing at a satisfactory pace”when it is above
60 percent of GDP; to make the budget target over
the cycle dependent on the debt situation and more
refined assessments of the long-run sustainability of
public finances; and to give countries with low debt
and sustainable finances longer time to correct exces-
sive deficits.
There is a case for changes in the direction proposed
by the Commission. But changes in the rules must be
transparent. Modifying the rules in such a way that
they are left open to interpretation would in effect
mean that case-by-case decision-making is substitut-
ed for a rules-based system. That would, for exam-
ple, happen if “country-specific circumstances” were
taken into account when evaluating fiscal per-
formance and deciding how fast excessive deficits
must be corrected. There should instead be a clear
rule linking the maximum permitted deficit to the
amount of debt, as suggested by EEAG (2003) and
Calmfors and Corsetti (2003). Discretionary deci-
sion-making works well for monetary policy, which
has been delegated to independent central banks. It
does not work for fiscal-policy decisions by politi-
cians, who could then always find excuses for lax
policies.
The Commission has also proposed a revision of the
so-called “exceptional circumstances clause” so that itwould allow countries to exceed the three-percent limit
not only in the case of negative growth but also in the
case of sluggish growth in a protracted slowdown.
Such a change could be motivated by the increased
diversity of the EU after enlargement. A deep down-
turn in the new fast-growing EU states might very well
be associated only with a large drop in the growth rate,
but not with negative growth. However, such a rule
must again be clearly formulated. It should allow
exceptions only when there is a large temporary decline
in GDP growth. A sustained decline in growth is not an
argument for permitting larger deficits, as a given
deficit-to-GDP ratio implies a higher long-run debt
ratio the lower is the trend rate of growth.
It would be very unwise at this stage to start exempt-
ing various types of government spending from the
calculation of deficits. As shown by the ongoing dis-
cussion, the list of suggested exemptions is endless:
real capital investment, military spending, expendi-
ture on innovation and R&D, expenditure on educa-
tion, net transfers to the EU budget, costs related to
the reform of social security and the tax systems, and
“specific burdens borne by the member states” (such
as the costs of unification in the case of Germany). In
fact, the introduction of any such exemption would
just trigger demands for additional exemptions. The
end result would be that the rules become entirely
toothless. 
It is often argued that softer budgetary requirements
would command more legitimacy and therefore be eas-
ier to enforce. However, a softening of the budgetary
requirements in the current situation would be per-
ceived as an endogenous response to the violations that
have occurred and would further undermine the credi-
bility of any fiscal rules at the EU level. The proper
way of preventing violations of the rules designed to
promote fiscal discipline cannot be to relax them to
such an extent that no one violates them any more.
Ex-ante prevention
There appears to be a consensus on the desirability of
strengthening budgetary surveillance in the Stability
Pact with the aim of enhancing peer pressure to avoid
that excessive deficits arise in the first place. For exam-
ple, the European Commission has proposed firmer
commitments to pursue restrictive fiscal policy in
upswings, greater interaction between the EU and
national levels in preparing the budgets in the member
states, and increasing the visibility of Commission
assessments of the budgetary situations in member
states by using the European Parliament as a forum for
presentations. In addition, the provision in the proposed
EU constitution that the Commission alone could issue
so-called early warnings would serve to increase ex-ante
pressure to avoid violations of the fiscal rules.
The underreporting of fiscal deficits in Greece has
highlighted the need for common rules ensuring that
national fiscal statistics are produced by independent
and reliable authorities, as well as the need to give the
European Commission and Eurostat large enough
resources to monitor the accuracy of national report-
ing more effectively. There appears also to be a need
for clear rules specifying which sanctions should
apply against countries that provide false data to dis-
guise budgetary problems.
Stronger ex-ante measures to prevent excessive deficits
from emerging would be welcome. But a key problem is
the “disconnect” between the political processes at the
national and the EU levels. One could try better to con-
nect the two processes by organising the “physical”pre-
sentations of Commission evaluations and Council
opinions in the national arena and by commitments of
national parliaments to hold public hearings in the case
of a formal critique from EU bodies. However, no ex-
ante preventive measures are likely to make much dif-
ference in the absence of credible ex-post enforcement
once violations have occurred.
Ex-post enforcement
If the stability pact is to remain an important disci-
plinary force, reforms must also address ex-post
enforcement. The root of the current problems is that
the excessive deficit procedure in the stability pact
suffers from an inherent contradiction: it is in essence
a judicial process administered by politicians (see also
Lindbeck and Niepelt 2004). The legalistic approach
is revealed by the terminology used: unless “correc-
tive action” against excessive deficits is taken, “sanc-
tions” in the form of “fines” should ultimately apply
and so on.
In principle, there are two ways of addressing the
enforcement problem. The first is to be consistent
about the judicial character of the process. In that
case one ought to move all decisions on sanctions
from the EU finance ministers to the European Court
of Justice. Such a proposal was put forward in EEAG
(2003).
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The second option is to keep political decision-
making as it is, but acknowledge that the ultimate
sanctions are now so harsh (an “atomic bomb”)
that politicians dare not employ them. A lowering
of the fines as compared to the present situation, in
which they could in principle amount to as much as
0.5 percent of GDP, would make their use more
credible. Lower fines should also apply at an earli-
er stage than is presently envisaged in the Stability
Pact.
In addition, the rules should be re-interpreted so that
the “fines” are instead regarded as “fees”, designed
as a disincentive to undesirable fiscal behaviour
rather than as a “punishment for crimes”. This
would contribute to flexibility. It would clarify that a
country may exceed the three-percent-of-GDP
deficit limit in a downturn, but that this can be done
only at a cost.
One idea that has been raised in the debate is that
deficits above three percent of GDP should not be
regarded as excessive if they can be “explained” by
forecast errors (made by the Commission). In our
view, there is no need for such exceptions, as the
procedures that already exist (in theory) give ample
time for reducing deficits due to expectational
errors. Rather, we see a considerable risk that such
exception possibilities would increase the risks of
biased forecasts. An illustration of this risk is pro-
vided by the Commission’s judgement in December
2004 that France and Germany are “on track to
correct their excessive deficits in 2005”, which
seems designed to avoid further political conflict on
how the ongoing excessive deficit procedures
against these countries should be handled
(European Commission 2004b).
An issue that ought to be addressed is the tendency of
violators of the budgetary rules to “collude”: as
recent experiences have shown, countries with exces-
sive deficits are likely to oppose sanctions against
other member states with excessive deficits in
exchange for getting a lenient treatment themselves.
This problem could be solved if countries that have
been formally declared to have excessive deficits were
not allowed to vote in the excessive deficit procedure
for other countries.15
Is there a future for the Stability Pact?
The first-best solution would be a package solution
involving some modifications of the budgetary
requirements as well as reforms strengthening ex-post
enforcement. Such a package deal needs to be accom-
panied by a resumption of the excessive deficit proce-
dures against France and Germany, as long as these
countries violate the rules, and a proper handling of
the Greek violations.
Unfortunately, political agreement among the EU
countries on credible enforcement is highly improba-
ble. Such an agreement may presuppose that decisions
are taken under a veil of ignorance of which countries
are likely to be exposed to enforcement measures,
which is not the current situation. Reforms to make
enforcement credible would probably also require
changes in the EU treaty (constitution), which are not
now politically realistic. The most likely outcomes are
either a softening of the budgetary requirements or
that no formal changes are made at all, leaving a wide
discrepancy between stipulations and implementa-
tion. In that case the Stability Pact may remain as a
benchmark, but the disciplinary impact will be slight.
Without credible enforcement we had better acknow-
ledge that the attempts to impose fiscal discipline
through the EU have largely failed. This interpreta-
tion gains support from recent political demands by,
for example, the German Chancellor to limit “inter-
vention of European institutions in the budgetary
sovereignty of national parliaments”(Schröder 2005).
The lesson would be that the foundations for sound
fiscal policy must be built through better institutions
at the national level. As discussed in EEAG (2003)
and Calmfors (2003), one can think of several more or
less radical reforms of national fiscal policy making
inspired by monetary policy making:
• A more transparent fiscal policy framework involv-
ing the adoption of clear long-run national fiscal
policy objectives as well as guidelines for the use of
fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool. Such a frame-
work could also specify appropriate procedures
when governments violate their own commitments,
such as requirements to give a formal explanation to
the parliament, stipulations that the parliament
must arrange public hearings with the finance min-
ister and outside experts etc.
• An obligation on the part of governments and par-
liaments to base budget decisions on economic
forecasts made by an independent forecasting
15 As of now, the formal decision on whether a larger deficit than
three percent of GDP should be regarded as excessive is taken by the
Ecofin Council with a qualified majority after a recommendation by
the Commission. According to the proposed constitution, the Ecofin
Council decision on whether a country has an excessive deficit
should instead be based on a proposal from the Commission, which
can only be voted down if there is unanimity in the Council. authority (see also Jonung and Larch 2004). Such
forecasts could be published in regular stabilisation
reports of a similar type as the inflation reports of
many central banks.
• An obligation on the part of government to con-
sult with an independent economic advisory coun-
cil before presenting budget proposals. Such a
council should work on the basis of economic pol-
icy objectives defined by the parliament. The gov-
ernment could be required to respond formally to
the recommendations of the council. The recom-
mendations could be given more “bite”by stipulat-
ing that the government should deviate from them
only in exceptional circumstances. If this happens,
the parliament could commit to holding public
hearings.
• Formal delegation of parts of fiscal policy making
to an independent fiscal policy committee that
would be given a well-defined mandate by parlia-
ment. The fiscal policy committee could be given
sole responsibility for the use of fiscal policy for
stabilisation purposes. Such a mandate could imply
the right to vary some tax rate(s) within a pre-spec-
ified band in order to smooth the business cycle.
The government would retain responsibility for fis-
cal policy decisions designed to affect the size of
government consumption, income distribution,
and social efficiency, but should commit in
advance to a rule for the long-run development of
government debt (with well-specified procedures in
case this commitment is not upheld, as discussed
above).
Even if budgetary discipline must build mainly on the
insight that it is in the national interest, the EU can
make an important contribution by trying to promote
the adoption of best-practice solutions. But this role
will be much more limited than originally envisaged in
the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact. How-
ever, a process where countries gradually learn from
“good examples” may be the best we can hope for.
Unfortunately, experience suggests that radical
reforms of national fiscal policy institutions come
only after serious crises. That is why fiscal discipline in
the EU countries may have to deteriorate further
before it can improve.
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Appendix 4:
VAR analysis of the effects of an increase in the oil
price and an appreciation on the euro zone
This appendix analyses the effects of an increase in
the oil price and a real effective appreciation on gross
domestic product and the inflation rate in the euro
zone using a Vector Autoregression (VAR). In
reduced form a VAR model has the following repre-
sentation:
Yt = A(L) Yt-1 + B(L) Xt + εt
where Yt is the vector of endogenous variables and Xt is
a vector of exogenous variables. The vector of endoge-
nous variables contains the Brent oil price in US dollars
(OIL), real gross domestic product (GDP), the har-
monised index of consumer prices (HICP), the nominal
3-month interest rate (EURIBOR) and the real effective
exchange rate of the euro against
42 countries (REER).The vector
of exogenous variables only con-
sists of a constant and a linear
trend. The data, which is at a
quarterly frequency, is taken from
Eurostat, the European Central
Bank and the OECD database.
The VAR was estimated in levels
using OLS over the period I/1980
– III/2004. By doing the analysis
in levels we allow for implicit coin-
tegrating relationships in the data.
With the exception of the interest
rate, which is in percent, the data
are expressed in logarithms and
are seasonally adjusted. A likeli-
hood ratio test and the Akaike
information criterion were used to
determine the lag order of the
VAR which turns out to be of
order five. The residuals of the
OLS estimation were free of auto-
correlation which was tested using
a correlogram and the related
Ljung-Box Q-statistic.
The effects of an unexpected
increase in the oil price and a real
appreciation of the euro are
investigated by means of impulse
response functions of the esti-
mated VAR. In order to identify
these structural shocks from the
reduced-form residuals of the
estimated VAR (εt), we use a standard recursive iden-
tification scheme with the endogenous variables
ordered as described above. 
The impulse responses, which are shown in Figure 1.1,
give the effect of a 20 percent increase in the oil price
(left column) and a 10 percent real effective apprecia-
tion of the euro in period 0 on the remaining variables
of the model, together with the 10 and 90 percent per-
centiles obtained through a standard bootstrapping
procedure with 100 draws. Thus, the true impulse
response function lies within the confidence band
(which is bounded by the two blue lines) with a prob-
ability of 80 percent, and the red line is computed as
the median of the confidence band. The horizontal
axis depicts the quarters following the shocks. Since
GDP, HICP, OIL and REER enter the model in log-
levels, deviations of these variables from the zero line
can be interpreted as a percentage deviation from an
Figure 1.1implicit long-run trend. The EURIBOR, by contrast,
enters the model in percent, so that its deviations from
the zero line indicate a deviation from the neutral
nominal interest rate in percentage points.
The impulse responses show that, following a real
effective appreciation of the euro by 10 percent, GDP
and HICP fall below their long-run trends (see
Figure 1.1). The effect reaches its maximum after
about three quarters and becomes insignificant there-
after. In terms of average annual growth rates (see
Table 1.1), GDP growth and HICP inflation fall by
about 0.12 and 0.17 percentage points, respectively,
below their long-run growth rates in the year follow-
ing the unexpected appreciation. As the reaction of
the EURIBOR to the exchange rate shock is insignif-
icant, we conclude that the European Central Bank
(and the average monetary policy of its predecessors)
did not react to exchange rate shocks.
Following an increase in the US dollar Brent oil price,
GDP falls and HICP increases. The effects on GDP
only become significant in the second year after the
shock when they also reach their maximum. HICP, by
contrast, immediately reacts to the increase in the oil
price and becomes insignificant after three years. The
maximum deviation of HICP from its long-run trend
is reached after four quarters. In terms of average
annual growth rates (see
Table 1.2), GDP growth falls by
0.20 percentage points in the sec-
ond year after the shock and by
0.12 percentage points in the
third year compared to its long-
run growth rate. HICP inflation
accelerates by 0.06 percentage
points in the first year. Con-
cerning the reaction of monetary
policy, the VAR analysis shows
that in the past the central banks
of today’s euro zone (whose aver-
age interest rate policy is depicted for the period
I/1980 – IV/1998) and the ECB followed a more
restrictive stance after an increase in the oil price and
raised interest rates by 0.20 percentage points in the
first year. The fact that we did not observe any change
in the monetary policy stance of the ECB in the
course of 2004 despite the surge in oil prices can be
explained by the one-dimensional view of our estima-
tion method. VARs only describe the effects of an iso-
lated shock, i.e. a shock that occurs independently of
any other shock, and the shock hits the economy in a
situation in which all the variables are on their long-
run path. Thus, a possible explanation of the ECB’s
interest rate policy in 2004 is that the euro zone had
already been hit by an adverse shock before the oil
price started to rise, which induced the ECB to lower
nominal interest rates to the current two percent level,
and hence a level which is clearly below the neutral
level.
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nd year 4.4 -0.32 0.05 0.23 5.2
*
3
rd year 0.9 0.25 0.37 -0.09 -2.0
Notes:
* significant at the chosen significance level (see text).
1) average deviation from a long-run trend in per cent.
2) average deviation of the year-on-year changes from the long-run trend growth
rates in percentage points.
3) average deviation from the neutral nominal interest rate in percentage points.
Source: Ifo Institute.
Table 1.2

















nd year -1.6 -0.20
* 0.00 -0.01 -0.4
3
rd year -1.0 -0.12
* -0.10 -0.14 0.5
Notes:
* significant at the chosen significance level (see text).
   1) average deviation from a long-run trend in per cent.
    2) average deviation of the year-on-year changes from the long-run trend growth
rates in percentage points.
 3)average deviation from the neutral nominal interest rate in percentage points.
Source: Ifo Institute